The monitor was the small one.
None of this is our work. Gamers Nexus, Level1Techs and two researchers — MrBruh and uturn — put 135 minutes of packet captures and bench tests on retail LG televisions. We're reporting it as theirs.
None of this is our work. Gamers Nexus, Level1Techs and two researchers — MrBruh and uturn — put 135 minutes of packet captures and bench tests on retail LG televisions. We're reporting it as theirs.
Sources: The Register (Sep 8) · Malwarebytes (Sep 7) · PPC Land (Sep 12) · the investigation itself
The answer to LG's denial, published the same week. All four videos →
“The claims made in the recently published video are not true.”
LG's televisions “do not continuously record or transmit user's conversations,” and speech-to-text “begins only if a user activates a voice interaction through a supported wake-word feature or by pressing the voice button on the remote control.”
LG, to Tom's Hardware and Engadget, September 9–12
Three things are worth separating out of that.
That the sets record ambient conversation.
The researchers describe transcripts produced with the screen off, which is a narrower claim than ambient recording. A second lab settles this, not a statement — and nobody has run one.
That the televisions scan the local network, which LG calls standard smart TV behaviour.
Nobody disputed that it happens. The question is why a television needs an inventory of your thermostat and your neighbour's Wi-Fi.
Content recognition runs on consent, LG says, and unrecognised audio is processed locally and deleted.
Consent is what Texas made LG rewrite in May. The finding here is volume — roughly 4GB a month, and a location payload leaving over HDMI.
Security researchers quoted by TechRadar made the same point: the denial answers the voice question and leaves the rest alone.
The researchers also reported remote code execution in webOS: the television's own browser renders a malicious page, which then forges a “a mobile device would like to pair with your TV” prompt. A compromised set sits inside the home network with a microphone attached.
Details are being withheld while responsible disclosure runs. No CVE has been published, no firmware fix has shipped, and LG hasn't addressed the vulnerabilities publicly. Waiting is the correct behaviour from everyone here, ourselves included. It's listed so it doesn't get lost behind the advertising story.
In 2013 an LG television was caught sending the filenames on a user's USB drive back to LG, and kept transmitting after the owner opted out. LG admitted it.
In December 2025 Texas sued five TV makers over content recognition. LG's US unit settled on May 11, 2026 with no admission of liability, agreeing to get consent before collecting viewing data, show a real disclosure and offer a working opt-out. Four months later came the captures above.
In July 2026, Spur found residential-proxy code in more than 42% of the apps on LG's own webOS store, quietly renting out the bandwidth of people's televisions. Krebs on Security reported it; LG said non-compliant apps would be suspended.
None of this stops the network scanning, and none of it touches the unpatched bug. It does cut what leaves the set.
Menu names move between webOS versions and regions. Look for Live Plus, Additional Settings and Advertisement.
We have not tested a television. Everything on this page is other people's work, labelled as theirs — our own bench work is the monitor. More about CEC ↗